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ARTICLES
Copyright and Software Technology Infringement:
Defining Third Party Development Rights
RAYMOND NIMMER* AND PATRICIA A. KRAUTHAUS**
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines software copyright in the United States as it applies
to value-added use of existing products and technology. While copyright is
the primary legal protection for widely distributed computer programs, ex-
isting law in this field lacks conceptual clarity. Copyright doctrine was
developed for literary and artistic works. It provides uncertain criteria for
technology issues. Software copyright cases are characterized by a perceived
need to prevent software "piracy" and the cases inadequately consider the
limits or underlying rationale of protection. Confusion results when copyright
standards are applied to value-added use of technology. In a value-added
use, a subsequent developer creates a new product, applying its own expertise
to prior work. This common form of technology and scientific development
is difficult to accommodate under copyright theory. This Article suggests an
analytical approach that deals with such situations.
Software protection issues are often perceived as a unidimensional conflict
between pirate and innovator. In this conflict, the obvious objective is to
protect the innovator. This view served well when the policy issue was whether
computer programs received any legal protection, but the availability of legal
protection is now established. Courts must apportion rights between the
original developer and third party access. The unidimensional model is in-
adequate.
Copyright doctrine applied to technology must balance two conflicting
themes. The first emphasizes the private nature of information and ideas,
while the second emphasizes their public nature. There should be economic
'incentives for innovation. Our law accomplishes this by granting control
over aspects of the use or distribution of a product. On the other hand, the
law should encourage dissemination, exchange and use of ideas. This is
grounded in historic notions about scientific research and development in
which innovation involves an additive process characterized by an interchange
* Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston.
** Partner, Nimmer & Krauthaus, Houston, Texas. Member, Texas Bar.
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among scientists. Subsequent developers routinely base their work on aspects
of existing technology and theory.
Both themes seek to facilitate innovation, but they conflict in commercial
science and technology development. In this Article, we first discuss the
development of software protection law in this country. The second portion
of the Article describes a framework for balancing interests when the original
innovator is in conflict with subsequent, value-added developers. The frame-
work builds on, but is not confined by traditional standards of literary
copyright. The competing commercial and scientific interests in technology
copyrights are not identical to those in literary contexts, and proceeding as
if they were distorts the issues.
I. COPYRIGHT AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
The flexibility and adaptive power of contemporary computer program-
ming facilitates expanded computer use. Early software protections, however,
focused on limited distribution products. Copyright became important only
when a mass market developed.' Copyright law protects "authors" for their
"expression" in "works of authorship '2 giving the author exclusive rights
to reproduce and distribute the work and to make derivative works based
on the original. These rights are perfected with minimal cost, making copy-
right well suited for readily reproduced mass market products.
The threshold issue faced by courts and the industry was whether statutory
copyright encompasses software technology. Computer programs are oper-
ating "instructions" that guide computer operations. A program creates an
electromagnetic framework in the machine that determines what processes
are implemented by the computer in response to various input. Programs
differ in function. One distinction is between application programs and
operating programs.3 "Application" programs include programs to achieve
1. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT (1978) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION]; Davidson, Protecting Computer Soft-
ware: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 611; Gemignani, Legal Protection for
Computer Software: The View From '79, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 269 (1980);
Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483 (1981);
Lawlor, A Proposal for Strong Protection of Computer Frograms Under the Copyright Law,
20 JURIMETRICS J. 18 (1979); Nimtz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection,
61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3 (1979); Stem, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software:
Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for the Object Code?, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 1 (1981); Note, Software
Piracy and the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Software Copyright Act Effective?, 4 COMPUTER
L.J. 171 (1983); Note, Copyrighting Object Code, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 421 (1983); Note, Copyright
Protection of Computer Object Code: Applying Old Legal Tools to New Technologies, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1983).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
3. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,
464 U.S. 1003 (1984).
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particular, task-oriented results such as accounting, database management,
and spreadsheet functions. "Operating" programs create the environment
in which an application program operates.
The literature often connects copyright policy to technical characteristics
found in an ideal cycle of program development. This cycle moves from an
idea for solving a task ("algorithm"), to an initial expression or outline
("flow chart"), to programming in a language such as BASIC or FORTRAN
("source code"), and to ultimate compilation in machine form as electro-
magnetic impulses ("object code") on disk, chip or other device.4 This
suggests a similarity between technology and traditional authorship. One
inference is that the technology is "merely" a new form of writing covered
by copyright law. While this might be valid policy, computer programs are
distinguishable from traditional authorship, especially When a program is in
electronic form to operate a machine. As a result, the alternative technical
argument is that, while source code is protectible, the machine stage is not
a writing and should not be protected.
These analyses do not raise relevant issues. Copyright protection is avail-
able to computer programs, but not because of a match between program
development and traditional authorship. Copyright protection varies based
on form and function, but not because of technical characteristics. Differ-
ences in format or function are pertinent only if they invoke different policy
considerations.
A. Commercial Interests and Product Protection
Traditional intellectual property law does not fully comport with the
commercial objectives of the software industry. This leads to recurrent
expressions of uncertainty about the adequacy of software protection. The
lack of congruence requires an elaboration of what interests are advocated
by the industry since some are neither precedented, nor desirable as elements
of a copyright protection system.
There is a widely supported desire for sanctions against unauthorized
commercial reproduction and sale of programs (software "piracy"). This
provided the framework for the early litigation on software copyright. "Pir-
acy" is a visible jurisdiction for protection, but the justification incorporates
a desire for protection not available to most "technology." Under current
law, many technologies can be freely copied after public distribution, so
long as no trademark infringement results. The commercial benefits of pro-
hibiting copying are obvious but not available to many products. The policy
issue is whether software should receive protection withheld from other
technology.
4. See, e.g., Keplinger, supra note 1; Nimtz, supra note 1.
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Aspects of the industry also urge that software publishers should control
non-commercial personal uses by the owner of a copy. Arguments against
commercial piracy do not extend to personal use, since personal use does
not preempt a recognized market. The industry preference defines the market
in terms of a single copy for a single machine and hopes to control personal
use. This maximizes potential sales, but creates a protection not available
even for other copyrighted works. For other works (e.g., books), while
unauthorized making of copies is prohibited, the copy owner may loan his
copy, permit others to use the book, or modify the book to optimize personal
utility. The publisher of a book cannot restrict your right to read the book
at home, on vacation or at the office.
A third protection deals with use of the original to create new products.
This includes value-added uses where the unauthorized party makes signif-
icant modifications that produce a new product. For the first author, works
based on the original are a form of piracy. The second party benefits from
the work of the first without compensating him for it. The second party
enters a market at less cost and earlier. The competitive market includes
products ranging from mere enhancements through widely extrapolated prod-
ucts based on methods employed in the original. By controlling the right to
develop products in this market, the original author may expand the useful
commercial life of the original product or leverage the earlier work to
capitalize on a demand for new products.
Whenever one work is based on another, the second party benefits from
the first either by reduced time and effort in developing the second product
or by access to a market created by the original. While there is a clear
benefit from the first work, this is less clearly objectionable than piracy and
may not justify legal restriction. Unlike the commercial pirate, the second
developer contributes to the new product. This process of sequential devel-
opment may enhance, rather than inhibit innovation. While there is a clear
need to reconcile competing interests, the policy objective is not simply or
purely to benefit the first author, but to promote innovation. Historically,
this has been done by adjusting economic controls given to the first party
to leave room for access by third parties. This balanced approach applies
to program technology in the absence of countervailing considerations.
There may be relevant policy differences based on different motivations
for use. One motivation is to save time and cost by using technology that
requires no further testing. This resembles the actions of the pirate, but it
defines a basic feature of additive research and development. The second
party need not "reinvent the wheel."
Other motivations relate to "compatibility" with existing systems.5 The
copier is concerned about the market for its product where a popular system
5. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
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establishes a de facto standard. The economic objective does not entail
substantial new development.
Issues about value-added use encompass control of ideas. Ideas, methods
and structures are valuable independent of the product. The policy issue is
whether appropriation of an idea can be precluded. Free use of ideas and
unpatented methods is characteristic of communal development of technol-
ogy. It is inherent in scientific models of research. In commercial technology,
however, an idea has significant economic value that can be enhanced by
restricting it to the original developer.
B. Intellectual Property
Intellectual property law generally balances the proprietary rights of the
first innovator and third party rights. There is a social policy favoring free
exchange and use of technology that is committed to the marketplace.6 This
applies not only in copyright law, but also in trade secrecy and patent laws.
Trade secrecy is a common law doctrine that reinforces established ex-
pectations of confidentiality.7 The proprietor of information is entitled to
enforce confidentiality restrictions that it established in disclosing informa-
tion. The protection is limited by several offsetting policies. Most important
here, confidentiality enforcement is limited by the right of the purchaser to
use information discovered by inspecting a product. This supports the com-
mon practice of "reverse engineering" where marketed products are pur-
chased and closely examined by competitors who develop compatible or
enhanced technology." For unpatented technology there is competition. The
first innovator's advantage is limited to the time necessary for competitors
to replicate the new products or methods. The second parties avoid the
research and development costs of the first innovator, but the first party
retains incentive for innovation because of the advantages inherent in the
"head start" period.
While often justified by the property rights of the "owner" of a product,
reverse engineering is a direct restraint on trade secrecy. It creates a protected
sphere for third party use of ideas and technology. This provides an avenue
for industrial innovation through competition based on accumulated, rather
than proprietary ideas. If a product is distributed on an open market,
protection against use of any secret discoverable through the product is
relinquished.
1985); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
6. See Davidson, Preliminary Report, ABA Subcommittee on Software Protection (July,
1985) (on file at University of Houston School of Law).
7. See generally R. MILGRim, TRADE SECRECY § 2.01 (1984).
8. See Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software Protection, 1 COMPUTER
LAW. 1 (February 1984).
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There is a similar balance in patent law. Patent is the statutory system
most directly oriented to innovation in technology. Patents convey control
over technology for a term of years, but are available only if the invention
entails substantial innovation that achieves a demonstrable break from prior
technology. This threshold precludes protection for many inventions that
have substantial commercial significance. 9 Proprietary rights, in effect, are
justified only in exceptional cases. Most technology innovations do not meet
patent standards. They are dedicated to public use once placed on the market.
The inventor in a patent procedure, in addition, must make a detailed
public disclosure. This delineates the invention and creates a public forum
for access to ideas. There are restraints on specific uses, but other inventors
may use the ideas disclosed. A patent does not control ideas or discovered
natural laws, but only inventions that use an idea or discovery. 0
Copyright was originally developed for much different products, but in-
corporates similar distinctions. Most significantly, copyright extends only to
forms of expression, not ideas or processes." The author controls publication
and form of expression, while others may use the ideas. For literary or
artistic works, this creates substantial latitude for third parties and the
distinction between idea and expression is easy to describe. It creates difficult
issues in technology copyright.
C. Copyright Subject Matter
The issues arise in two ways. One relates to defining when copying part
of a work violates the original copyright-a question of copyright infringe-
ment. This is discussed later. A second relates to copyright subject matter
and defines whether a particular work is covered by copyright law at all. If
a copyright protection would necessarily result in protection of an idea or
process, no copyright is available.
The Copyright Act mandates that copyright not protect ideas or processes. 2
The statutory exclusion that copyright not extend to a "process" allocates
the scope between patent law and copyright law. While patents encompass
rights in machine and other processes, copyrights do not. This distinction
requires a decision about whether the nature of a work is such that protection
should be relegated to patent or trade secret laws. A decision against copy-
rightability on this basis reflects a conclusion that any copyright protection
would protect a process that is better handled under industrial property law
standards, even if this results in providing no protection.
9. See R. ND&MER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ch. 2 (1985).
10. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
11. See generally 1 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.03[D], 13.03[A] (1985) [hereinafter M.
NIMMER].
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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There is little useful guidance for this decision in copyright law. Prior to
computer programs, the distinction could be easily illustrated. In literary
works, writings described a process, but the process actually occurs in a
different physical environment. A formula may describe a chemical reaction,
but it is distinct from the actual chemical interaction. Copyright protects
the written description, but does not permit the author to control use of
the process. The historical distinction is between description and physical or
mechanical action. A similar distinction is possible for programs not in
machine form. Source code describes a computer operation, but is distin-
guishable from the mechanical operation itself. In machine form, however,
the distinction becomes esoteric. An explicit policy judgment is needed. The
machine "code" not only describes but implements operations. If is both
process and description.
The copyright principle that excludes any protection for ideas, defines
scope within copyright rather than between copyright and patent law. The
policy is that ideas in copyrighted works should be available for general use.
The copyright owner controls reproduction of its expression in a book, but
not the idea expressed. Applied to copyrightability, since the issue is whether
a work receives any copyright protection, the exclusion should be viewed in
narrow terms. Third party uses can be protected through infringement stand-
ards, while granting protection to the original work against literal piracy.
The relevant issue is whether protection of "expression" is separable from
control over the "idea."'" Copyright extends to a "work" unless there is a
necessary and unavoidable correspondence between protection and the pro-
hibited control. There is a separability analysis. One form involves the "idea-
expression identity" doctrine which denies copyright if there is literal identity
between the underlying idea and the manner of expression.' 4 The statute
mandates that copyright not create an idea monopoly. If there is only one
way to express an idea, copyright is denied to preserve exchange of ideas.
In cases of direct conflict, the statutory balance favors free use of "ideas."
The leading case is Baker v. Selden5 which involved a book that described
a system of bookkeeping and included forms integral to the system. The
issue was whether the defendant's use of similar forms constituted an in-
fringement. The Court noted:
13. See generally Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Durham
Indus. Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife
Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), reh'g
denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
816 (1958). As applied to computer programs, see Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d at 521; Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1240.
15. 101 U.S. at 99.
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[Where the art [a work] teaches cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar
to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary
incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public.... [B]lank
account-books are not the subject of copyright .... 16
Baker has been applied to instructions for games or contests where there
may be several ways of describing contest rules, but the available variations
are limited. 7 Where more than one form of expression is possible, but the
subject is very narrow, admitting only a limited number of forms, "copyright
does not extend to the subject matter at all, and plaintiff cannot complain
even if his particular expression was deliberately adopted.' ' 8 As the range
of available expression narrows, copyright protection gives way to the goal
of denying the "author" a monopoly of the underlying process or idea.' 9
A related analysis involves useful objects such as lamps and desks. Copy-
right does not extend to utilitarian aspects of objects, but only expressive
content and form. 20 "[The] design of a useful article . . . shall be [copy-
rightable] only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
[expressive] features that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspect of the article." 2'
Separability analyses are relevant to whether computer programs are copy-
rightable, but it is difficult to match the criterion to the policy issue. "2 Issues
about software protection deal with a creative industry different from print,
video or music media. Decisions about protecting software are connected to
protecting machine processes and scientific or technological concepts.23 Whether
we segregate them or not, this basic fact must be acknowledged. Protections
for these traditionally are found in patent and trade secrecy laws. The con-
16. Id. at 103, 107.
17. Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 675.
18. Id. at 678-79.
19. See R. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.02(3); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 201; Baker, 101 U.S. at
99; Durham, 630 F.2d at 905; Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 62; Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1157;
Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 675; Continental, 253 F.2d at 702.
20. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN.
L. REv. 707, 730 (1983) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 201; Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp.,
703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983); Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983);
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). Underlying the
decisipn is a judgment about whether the particular item is a useful article. See Kieselstein-
Cord, 632 F.2d at 989 (belt buckle is jewelry); Gay Toys, Inc., 703 F.2d at 970 (toy airplane
has no intrinsic utilitarian function).
22. See H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976); see also S. REp. No. 473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975). "[If] an article has any intrinsic utilitarian function, it can be
denied copyright protection except to the extent that its artistic features can be identified
separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art." Fabrica, 697 F.2d at
893.
23. See Denicola, supra note 20, at 707; Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright for
Advanced Technology, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 450 (1982).
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temporary issues are whether and in what form copyright extends to this
environment.
II. COPYRIGHTABILITY AND COMMERCIAL PIRACY
The most widely supported objective in software protection is to establish
legal restraints against software piracy (i.e., unauthorized commercial re-
production and sale). Commercial piracy has direct financial effects on mass
market programs because it preempts markets otherwise available to the
original developer. There is no productive contribution by the pirate. By
appropriating the first work, the pirate favorably competes in price against
the author who must recoup prior expenses. This reduces the profit for the
original "author" and affects the incentive for research necessary for tech-
nology development.
Piracy was the major factor underlying application of copyright law to
computer programs. Copyright protection can be perfected with minimal
cost and creates exclusive legal rights to reproduce copies of a "work.
24
As a result, copyright methodology matches the commercial objective, and
other forms of protection are either inadequate against piracy or entail
substantial cost. Early debate about software copyright was inseparable from
the simple issue of whether programs should be protected from piracy. 25
The objection to piracy reflects a desire for protected product uniqueness.
The policy issue is whether or not computer programs should receive such
protection of uniqueness. Because of the nature of the issue, discussion of
copyright protection often involves argument by analogy to industrial proc-
esses or by analogy to literature. Industrial property is not protected against
piracy absent confidentiality restraint or patent protection. Literary works
are protected by copyright.
Argument by analogy is not productive. Computer programs contain char-
acteristics of both technology and authorship. The choice for computer
software ultimately turns on direct policy decision, rather than analogy. If
the primary policy is to prevent unauthorized commercial copying, this
requires copyright protection or a newly legislated alternative.
Legal protection against copying creates understandable commercial ben-
efits, but why should software receive protection not available in other
industries? This can be approached in two ways. The most general argument
asserts .that laws which fail to prohibit literal duplication of technology
encompass outdated policy. In a society that relies on technology develop-
ment, it may be appropriate to protect all technology against duplication.
24. See generally R. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.02-.15; Gilbourne, The Proprietary Rights
Pyramid: An Integrated Approach to Copyright and Trade Secret Protection for Software, 1
CoMpuTER LAW. I (March 1984).
25. Davidson, supra note 1.
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The weakness in this view is that, in many industries, competitors use
identical technology, but there is a competitive marketplace in which tech-
nology change is rapid and continuous. Trade secrecy permits the developer
a "head start" without constraining other parties once the technology is
publicly disclosed. Except for patented innovations, secondary marketers are
uninhibited by legal barriers absent a breach of confidence. The emphasis
is on maximum freedom of cumulative development. Literal reproduction
creates competition based on efficient use of technology. This supports
substantial technology growth in many industries. Software technology re-
quires different treatment only if there is a cognizable reason to anticipate
that these patterns will not occur for computer program products.
The second approach to the policy issue distinguishes computer programs
based on the character of programs. 26 The distinguishing feature is that,
while time and effort are needed to create a product, a -program can be
inexpensively duplicated. The "pirate" appropriates the technology in a
manner similar to that for video tapes, records and cassette tape recordings.
This contrasts with traditional manufacturing technology where duplication
requires constructing or reworking assembly lines or plants and retraining
personnel. Duplication of software does not even require that the pirate
learn the technology. The copier merely uses a "recording" device. The
"recording" does not merely approximate the technology, it recreates it.
The ease of copying creates a primary incentive for "piracy" and an im-
balance in cost. More important, it reduces "head start" advantages. If the
second developer must adapt and invest resources to learn and apply the
technology, the cost advantages are reduced; the activities require time. This
retains commercial advantage for the original developer. These natural "pro-
tections" are lost in reproduction of software. The pirate quickly undercuts
price while marketing a product identical to the original shortly after it
reaches the market.
Ease of reproduction is characteristic of other products that receive co-
pyright protection. It is a supportable premise that this is one generic role
for copyright: copyright precludes literal reproduction of any product that
has creative content and that is subject to rapid, inexpensive and compre-
hensive copying which effectively eliminates otherwise natural advantages of
the original innovator in the marketplace. Absent protection, the nature of
the product obviates incentive for innovation.
A. 1976 Copyright Reforms
The legislative development of the Copyright Act supports this conclusion.
Computer program protection was unclear. In 1976, Congress enacted a
26. NATIONAL CoMMISSION, supra note 1, at 21.
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revised Copyright Act, but section 117 of that Act disclaimed any intention
to alter program copyright status. This created a moratorium to permit
further study. A Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) was appointed. The CONTU report supported copyright
for programs and led to the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 and
copy protection at least to most programs.
CONTU argued that, but for section 117, under the 1976 Act, copyright
extended to computer programs. 27 CONTU presented several arguments fa-
voring copyright protection. Central to its position was that software was
the product of "great intellectual labor" that merited legal protection against
easy duplication. Characterizing software as a "new type of writing," co-
pyright protection was essential to maintain incentive for development and
dissemination.
The report was less clear about the scope of protection. The majority
rejected suggestions that would exclude all programs in machine form, but
affirmed that the author's protection should be restricted by traditional
concepts of copyright: "Copyright ... protects the program so long as it
remains fixed in a tangible medium of expression but does not protect the
electro-mechanical functioning of a machine.... Thus, one is always free
to make a machine perform any conceivable process . . . but one is not free
to take another's program. ' 28 This analysis side-stepped a central issue.
Whether one can make a machine perform the electro-mechanical "process"
without -appropriation of the program in its machine form is less than
apparent and is a focus of judicial controversy.
B. Judicial Action Against Piracy
Despite the support of CONTU and the Congressional response, there was
continuing controversy about the copyrightability of computer programs.
The appellate cases support a conclusion that computer programs are co-
pyrightable.
Copyrightability relates most immediately to legal barriers against piracy.
A decision that a program is not copyrightable permits literal copying. This
is appropriate only if all pertinent interests support a complete denial of
protection. As a result, analyses that deny copyright to preserve free access
to ideas and processes should be narrowly construed. Denial of copyright
is proper only if barriers to literal duplication would substantially foreclose
an area or field of technical development. The further question of whether
copyright bars creation of similar, but not identical works is an infringement,
issue.
27. Id. at 16. See also S. RaP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1976).
28. NATiONAL COMMASSION, supra note 1, at 20.
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Written "source code" is copyrightable. 29 Greater difficulties of analysis
are present for programs in machine form (diskette, tape or chip). In this
form, programs are electromagnetic configurations described as "object code."
Two distinct works might be associated with the machine program. The first
is the object code itself. The second is the output of the program in audio,
visual or printed form.
Output that is otherwise copyrightable does not lose this status because
it is stored in a computer.30 If a program produces a display of copyrightable
images, it is immaterial that the images are produced by electrical functions
or by pencil. The method does not alter the product. The computer does
not contain the images but only the electromagnetic "instructions" that
create them. A work of authorship nevertheless exists if it is capable of
reproduction or communication "directly or indirectly with the aid of ma-
chine or other device."'" A song retains copyright protection even as recorded
on a disk.
Output is copyrightable even if the user and the programmer both con-
tribute to it. In video games, for example, the program creates a display of
images and sequences of action based in part on the input of the user. The
visual effects and play can be created by various programs. As a result, it
is common to copyright the images, rather than merely the underlying pro-
gram code. Copyright of the output is attributed to the programmer if the
images created by the program have sufficient originality. a2 The sequence of
play is copyrightable if substantial portions are determined by the program
and repeat despite variations due to the player.33
Copyright of output protects against some piracy. If output is copyrighted,
reproduction of the program code is a prohibited copy of the output. 34 This
treats the object code as a storage media. As with electromagnetic aspects
of video tapes, it does not require a conclusion that object code itself is
29. See Affiliated Hosp. Prods. Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir.
1975); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945). In these cases, while there
may have been other means of expression of the commands, the need to convey pertinent
information restricts the range of alternatives in a very spartan, limited environment. But see
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978);
Keplinger, supra note 1, at 507.
30. See R. NIMME R, supra note 9, § 1.03(4); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, 725
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983); Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Cf. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908). See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 21.
32. See Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern, 669 F.2d
at 856.
33. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; Stern, 669 F.2d at 856.
34. See Midway, 704 F.2d at 1012; Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982);
Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56; In re Certain Coin-Operated Audiovisual Games and Components




copyrightable. This is not important in video or sound recordings since the
output is the focus of protection. Object code protection has independent
importance for computer programs, however, since output copyright leaves
gaps in protection that are difficult to justify as a matter of policy.
One gap arises for complex programs that create expressively mundane
output (e.g.i an accounting form). This output lacks expressive content and
is not copyrightable.35 The form is a basic tool of art that cannot be
appropriated by one but must be available for all. Unless object code is
copyrightable in such cases, the program is unprotected even though it
involves substantial creative effort. This risk exists for database, operating
system and spreadsheet programs that are central to microcomputing1 6 This
complex and commercially valuable software creates little copyrightable out-
put. Unless object code is copyrightable, there is no barrier to appropriation.
The policy rationale for protecting these programs against piracy is no
less compelling than for video games. The technical barriers, however, are
substantial. Distinguishing expression, idea and process in such programs is
difficult. Also, section 102(a) of the Copyright Act restricts copyright to
works fixed in a tangible "medium of expression" from which they can be
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated. ' 3 7 This requires human
communication, but unlike videotapes, even with a computer, the program
generates no copyrightable expression in normal use.38
The risk of piracy provides the impetus for protection, but the copyright
analysis entails an effort to establish identifiable expression in the program.
One manifestation examines if it is possible to reverse a program to produce
source code or a listing of object code. A conclusion that such reversal is
possible supports a view that the machine program is a "copy" of the source
code or a copy of the typical representation of object code.3 9 This analysis
35. For cases supporting the idea that materials lacking expressive content are not copyright,
see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C.
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947) (standardized charts); Taylor Instrument Co. v.
Fawley Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944) (routine data
presentation). See also Affiliated Hosp. Prods. Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co.; 513 F.2d 1183
(2d Cir. 1975); Cash Dividend Check Corp. v. Davis, 247 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1957); Chamberlin
v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945); E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., 16 F.R.D.
571 (E.D. Pa. 1954). Cf. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (protection given to answers sheets against literal copying because
symbols designating questions or response spaces are expression).
36. See Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d at 521; Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1240. See
also Stern, supra note 1; Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Object Code: Applying Old
Legal Tools to New Technologies, supra note 1; Note, Copyrighting Object Code, supra note
1.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
38. See Stern, supra note 1. Cf. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Object Code:
Applying Old Legal Tools to New Technologies, supra note 1.
39. See GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (copy of'
source code); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (copy of object
code).
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invites debate about whether the typical representation of object code in
binary (O's and l's) or hexidecimal numbers constitutes human communi-
cation; but the difficulty is not that source and object code are obscure
languages. The "authors" do not intend to communicate the code to third
parties by the program. 40
This debate has little to do with the question of whether protection against
piracy should extend to programs that lack expressive output. These programs
configure and control a machine to accept, transmit or reproduce information
supplied by another source. The program is integral to the machine process,
and control of reproducing the program in a machine constitutes some control
over duplication of the process. 4' The basic legal question concerns whether
this control is available under copyright or whether copyright should be
denied to preserve access to the process. Denial of protection avoids a
monopoly, but exposes a valuable product to piracy.
The analytical tool in copyright law focuses on the extent to which pro-
tection of "expression" can be segregated from prohibited control over an
underlying "process" or "idea." The cases make a direct effort to define
process (or idea) distinct from coded "expression." An equivalence between
program code (expression) and machine process exists if there is one or only
a very limited number of ways to "express" a process in object code. If
various methods exist, copyright protects the technology. Copyrightability
is barred if there are no alternative means to create the process without
copying the code.
The statement of this standard does little to determine the degree of
available protection. The critical step involves the court's conception of a
"process" or "idea." In defining a "process," the court implements a policy
choice central to program protection. It does so under limited technical or
legal guidance. In one view, "process" refers to electron flow (the physical
operations), while expression encompasses that which remains. This is con-
sistent with traditional copyright distinctions, but difficult to apply to com-
puter programs in machines. The machine program determines the "electron
flow."
The cases adopt an alternative conception that refers to the "functions"
performed. Under this view, program "functions" are equated to unpro-
40. Stern, supra note 1, at 12. In the same manner, it has generally been held that the use
of a copyrighted work to create a tangible object through applying designs and the like is not
an infringement. See Tompkins Graphics Inc. v. Zipatone, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 49 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). Cf. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972); WPOW, Inc.
v. MRLJ Enters., 584 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1984) (use of engineering drawings to construct
a broadcast tower). In many cases, the technical issue of whether use of the drawings to
construct a building infringes the copyright is mooted by the fact that the defendant copied
the architectural or other plans in the course of the construction work. See Aitken, Hazen,
Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982); 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 11, § 2.08[D].
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976); see also S. REP. No. 473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1975).
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tectible processes. If the primary functions of the program can be replicated
by another program that does not infringe the code of the first, copyright
of the first program provides no control of a process. If the functions cannot
be replicated without infringing the code, copyright is precluded. The dif-
ficulty remains notwithstanding this analytical framework. A wide range of
judgment exists in defining whether any particular machine activity consti-
tutes a "function" for purposes of this decision. If every detailed action is
a "function," non-copyrightability is likely since a second program must
reproduce the program code in detail to replicate all actions. In contrast, a
concept of "functions" restricted to major activities or general concepts
supports copyrightability, since the general concepts can be manifest in
numerous ways.
The choice entails a matter of policy, rather than technical definition. The
appropriate definition preserves protection unless this substantially disrupts
technological development. The reported decisions adopt this view and sup-
port copyright of virtually all programs.
The two major cases involve duplications of an operating system for a
competing line of computers. The economic incentive for copying was to
ensure that the second computer could use software already available for
the first. 42 This is important to marketing. Since minor differences in an
operating system preclude use of some software, literal copying may be
necessary.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. 43 the defendant
admitted copying the programs, but argued that "programs ... designed
... to be used to control computer operations and [that] do not directly
produce the visual image or 'expression' which the computer user discerns'
44
should be excluded from copyright. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the argument that protection
for machine programs should be based on whether or not they have expressive
output. It also concluded that idea and expression (process) did not merge.4
The evidence reported by the district court supports this conclusion only
if based on a particular view of a "process." The district court emphasized
that Apple's position was that Formula should not be allowed "to market
programs which perform the same function in the exact same manner" as
Apple's. 46 An operating system provides an environment for -application
programs. The district court cited testimony that "numerous" ways existed
to write operating systems that allow operation of ninety-eight percent of
42. See Davis, IBM PC Software and Hardware Compatibility, 1 COMPUTER LAw. 11 (July
1984); Chertok, Compatibility: Fair Use or Derivative Work, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 1004
(1984).
43. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
44. Formula Int'l, 562 F. Supp. at 780.
45. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d at 525.
46. Formula Int'l, 562 F. Supp. at 782.
47. Id.
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the application programs available for Apple computers.4 7 The Ninth Circuit
assumed that these operating systems created the same "process" as the
Apple programs. 48 For application programs within the two percent, however,
the alternative operating process is not the same or even an acceptable
alternative.
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the degree of similarity required to
conclude that different programs create the same process. If the "process"
is not defined by the application programs that can be accommodated, what
alternative definition exists? If less than 100% similarity is acceptable, co-
pyright controls at least one combination of machine activities. The copyright
ban on protecting a process arguably requires that a third party be able to
create a 100% compatible system. The court's conception, however, permits
limited control in order to protect the underlying program against piracy.
Formula's purpose for using Apple's programs was to access a market
defined by compatibility. Compatibility allows a second manufacturer to
benefit from the base of existing software for a popular machine, and copying
permits competition with reduced development cost. The issue in Formula
was whether copyright should bar such competition. 49 The court answered
in the affirmative. There was a choice between differing conceptions of a
marketplace. Formula sought to deny copyright protection to Apple in order
to create a market for Apple competitors. In protecting Apple, the court
preserved the copyright at the cost of this particular competitive framework.
The second appellate decision is Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp.0 Franklin involved the same programs and a similar fact setting
as in Formula. The district court, in Franklin, denied a preliminary injunc-
tion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded, rejecting the argument that there is a per se merger of idea and
expression in an operating system program.
The Third Circuit defined the issue as whether "other programs can be
written or created which perform the same function as an Apple operating
system program."'" If other programs can be written, the particular operating
system program represents expression, separable from the process. A case-
by-case analysis is required. Exclusion depends on the interpretation of the
underlying idea and proof of the extent to which the functions of the program
can be performed by other programs. Since the case was remanded for
factual findings, the court only briefly discussed the test.
The court rejected Franklin's emphasis on the fact that only a limited
number of ways existed to program machine code such that the computer
could operate all Apple-compatible applications software.
48. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d at 524-25.
49. See Davis, supra note 42; Chertok, supra note 42.
50. 714 F.2d at 1240.
51. Id. at 1253.
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This claim has no pertinence to either the idea/expression dichotomy or
merger.... The idea of one of the operating system programs is, for
example, how to translate source code into object code. If other methods
of expressing that idea are not foreclosed ... then there is no merger.
Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility ... but that is a
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions
have merged. 2
The Third Circuit emphasized a broad concept of the "idea" of an operating
system and equated the unprotected "process" with that idea. It rejected
the view that one mdhsure of whether the "process" can be duplicated is
whether all application programs for one system can be operated by another.5 3
A court's manner of defining "idea" or "process" expresses commercially
significant legal policy. The definition does not flow from some inherent
concept of "process." An interpretation requiring proof that others retain
an ability to replicate 100% of the program's functions implements the
mandate against protecting a process, but exposes a valuable product to
wholesale appropriation. Both appellate courts adopted a different standard,
protecting the original developer against comprehensive, literal duplication
of its product. The decisions protect valuable programs independent of
output, but impede comprehensive third party access to markets created by
popular products to the extent access requires exact recreation of the first
program.5 4
III. INFRINGEMENT AND VALUE-ADDED USE
The policy decision that extends copyright to software technology as a
protection against piracy provides little guidance for cases of value-added
use. Value-added use is not equivalent to piracy. The pirate merely duplicates
the program for commercial gain. This may create economic benefits, forcing
competition based on production and distribution efficiency, but piracy does
not directly contribute to innovation. In contrast, the person who creatively
enhances the original or uses aspects to develop a new product. participates
in technology development in a manner that is important in a comprehensive
approach to promoting innovation. Copyright law precludes some forms of
value-added use, but many value-added developments should be free of
copyright restraints. Determining whether a particular activity infringes the
original or represents protected development requires a balancing that dis-
criminates between protecting the first author and maintaining flexibility for
secondary development.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1252-53.
54. Antitrust considerations impact the extent to which the original author/innovator can
maintain an exclusion from compatible markets. See R. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 5.04.
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The clear commercial incentives for the original developer orient to pre-
venting competition, controlling value-added use of its technology. Substan-
tial market advantages associated with the original program technology can
be exploited through related products. This encompasses use of program
code, but incorporates control of ideas, design and structures of the original
work. Idea content may contain more value than the code, but free use of
ideas is central to sequential and additive development of technology.
Value-added use occurs whenever a second party employs the initial work
as a basis or model, but engages in nontrivial modifications to create a new
product. From the perspective of the original author, the second party
appears to benefit illicitly from the ideas and work of the first. On the other
hand, there are substantial reasons to define some value-added use as beyond
the control of the proprietor of the original program. A model encouraging
innovation through multiparty involvement and dissemination of ideas re-
quires rights of access and use, permitting diverse innovators to use the
insights of others.
A. Substantial Similarity and Infringement
Under traditional copyright standards, this balancing occurs in the context
of deciding whether a second work is an infringing "copy" of the first.
Assuming that the second party had access to the work, the primary issues
are whether there is "substantial similarity" in the two and whether the
similarity is based on protected expression or unprotected ideas.
Copyright gives an author exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute
copies of a work. 55 Copyright does not preclude independent creations. An
action for infringement therefore requires distinguishing copies from inde-
pendently created works. Unless there is literal duplication, copying is gen-
erally established indirectly based on proof that: 1) the defendant had access
to the original work, and 2) there is substantial similarity between the two
works sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant copied the
original.56
Copyright also grants the exclusive right to prepare derivative works "based
on" the original. A "derivative work" qualifies for separate copyright pro-
tection as to new expressive material.57 This extends to less than all works
that in colloquial terms "derive" from an original. Copyright protection of
derivative works is construed in conjunction with section 102(b) which limits
copyright to expression. A "derivative work" incorporates the expression
of the original, and a subsequent program is a derivative work only to "the
extent that the [second program] incorporates some or all of [the original]
55. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
56. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.01.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982); see also I M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 3.04.
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copyrighted programs. 's 8 In absence of "substantial similarity" of expres-
sion, the second work is not derived from the original in a copyright sense.
Because infringement commonly involves distribution of copies, questions
about whether the right to control derivative works is violated most often
are subsumed in questions about whether there is sufficient similarity to
constitute an infringing copy.
Substantial similarity involves factual judgments, controlled by underlying
policy judgments. The statutory mandate that copyright does not extend to
ideas or processes has a major effect. Within the standard of "substantial
similarity," two premises emerge. First, there is no right to duplicate sub-
stantial portions of the expression of a copyrighted work without authori-
zation. Second, subsequent parties can copy and use the "ideas" from a
work or reproduce the "process" without permission.
Under copyright and other fields of industrial property law, the author's
protection is subordinate to the objective of maintaining free ideas. Idea
and, process copying is a privileged, protected act. As a result, in any
"substantial similarity" case, the court must distinguish similarity due to
copied idea and similarity of copied expression. 9 Copyright precludes only
the latter. Two works that focus on the same subject and pursue similar
ideas will appear similar, but an infringement occurs only if the similarity
results from copied expression, divorced of a privileged similarity in ideas.
Similarity traceable to similar ideas is not an infringement even if the second
author copied the idea.
This can be viewed as a technical issue in which the pertinent inquiry
defines which portions of a work are ideas and which are expression. The
judgments can be variously described, but are inherently unstable. All aspects
of a work entwine idea and expression. What constitutes expression and
what constitutes an idea for purposes of infringement reflects a judgment
about the work and about whether protection should be granted against a
specific subsequent product. There are different conceptions for different
types of copyrighted works.6
In defining the unprotected idea in an infringement case, a court makes
a decision about the degree of protection for the original author and the
degree of freedom for subsequent authors. This can be addressed directly.
The first author is increasingly protected if the idea is defined in broad or
58. Freedman v. Select Information Sys., Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 848, 850 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
59. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[t]here ... must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas
but of the expressions of those ideas as well."); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
60. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1140
(9th Cir. 1983); Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167-68; cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954);




general terms. Given a broad definition, most of the work represents "expres-
sion" of a general idea: As the protection for the author grows, however,
the freedom for second authors decreases. The converse is equally true.
61
As the "idea" is defined in more specific terms, the freedom for a secondary
user is expanded. The detail of the work becomes identified as the unpro-
tected idea. The decision must explicitly recognize the factors that weigh
toward or against protection of the first author. These differ for different
forms of authorship.
The issues and values balanced here are materially different from those
in defining an "idea" or "process" for purposes of copyrightability. Co-
pyrightability determines whether the work receives any protection against
even literal reproduction. "Substantial similarity" questions arise only if
basic protection is established. Defining the "idea" in substantial similarity
terms relates to particular conflicts between two works that are not identical.
It is the primary methodology that sets the boundaries of protection for
third party developers.
1. Fiction Works
"Substantial similarity" is frequently litigated in fiction and other artistic
works. Copyright precludes appropriation of those portions of a work that
most contribute to its commercial or artistic value and uniqueness. Sub-
stantial similarity combines quantity and quality, but no precise percentages
define how much of a work can be appropriated. Appropriation of a small,
but significant portion is infringement.
Fiction and artistic works involve creatively diverse expression and sub-
stantial variety. Creatively important aspects consequently often can be pro-
tected without substantially limiting options for subsequent authors. The
desirability of uncontrolled third party use and development in fiction is not
well-established and may be unnecessary beyond very general ideas. The
main copyright objective for fiction works defines the first author's rights
to encompass broadly subsequent works based on the original (e.g., movie
adaptations, sequels, derivative toys).
For fiction works, substantial similarity cases focus on the degree of
similarity and not whether the alleged infringer made a creative contribu-
tion.6 2 Similarity is examined in reference to whether an "ordinary observer"
would regard the two works as similar because the second work captures
61. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (similarity of dolls due to similar ideas where idea defined as "superhuman
muscleman crouching in ... a traditional fighting pose"); Innovative Concepts in Entertain-
ment, Inc. v. Entertainment Enters. Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (infringement of
hockey player figures and game board's configuration of "snow").
62. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1I, § 13.03[B].
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the unique expression or aesthetic appeal of the first.63 This standard orients
to the commercial market. Phrased solely in terms of the reaction of the
audience, the approach has been criticized.Y Recent cases retain the general
standard, but formulate various analyses that differentiate between ordinary
-audience reactions and permitted copying of an idea.65 While the law may
be uncertain, the basic tension is apparent. It blends audience reaction and
doctrinal examination. If a work does not appear to the audience to be
substantially similar to another, there is no appropriation. Even if there is
apparent similarity, however, it is essential to determine whether the similarity
is caused by copying protected or unprotectible elements of the first work.
A related theme involves scenes a faire. These are common or standard
expressions that can be expected to appear in works of a particular type.
Given similar ideas, structure or purpose, certain expressions or images are
so common as to be insufficient to support an action for infringement. To
the extent that an alleged similarity involves scenes a faire, the similarity is
generic and inadequate for infringement. 66 It often is suggested that these
expressions are not copyrightable. Some duplication is inherent and not
copying. 67 Stock phrases, standard lines and common characters are central
to the development of the pertinent art. Limiting their use would impede,
rather than promote creative work. These standard items accordingly are,
in effect, public domain available for all authors.
In fiction works, duplication of some of the language or images of work
involves difficult legal questions. Even greater difficulty arises if there is no
duplication of actual language, but the plot or characters are similar. In
fiction, non-literal reproduction may be actionable. As the range of com-
mercial derivatives of fiction works expands, expressive "similarity" must
be defined broadly to go beyond verbatim copying. A movie based on a
novel duplicates little of the language in the book, but a copyright doctrine
that allows a third party to freely appropriate the theme in a movie would
reduce the commercial incentive for book publishing.
A finding of "substantial similarity" in the absence of literal copying
must be preceded by a close analysis to distinguish ideas and expression. A
decision that there is substantial similarity requires a conclusion that aspects
of the plot, structure and character are expression, rather than unprotected
ideas. The traditional approach involves a variable line drawing described
in the following terms:
63. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980); Franklin
Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 880 (1978).
64. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[D].
65. See North American, 672 F.2d at 607; Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1157.
66. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. 11. 1983);
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
67. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.18[A-D].
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Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about ... but there is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
6
'
This places a premium on the decision-maker's judgment. In an open-
ended framework, the analysis must be guided by a clear reference to the
purpose of the law being applied. While nonliteral copying might be outside
the purview of copyright, this would reduce the economic incentives for
creativity that copyright intends to promote. The law should enhance those
incentives, while not unduly inhibiting other authors. In many fiction works,
creativity in elements of character, structure and plot establish the major
commercial value that should be protected. Copyright protection, further-
more, often will not impede subsequent authors because an infinite number
of variations in plot and character are available.
While nonliteral similarity supports an action for infringement, 69 the anal-
ysis carefully identifies and limits protection to the portion of the original
that is sufficiently central to justify protection. The appropriate line differs
depending on the type of work and the range of alternatives available. A
plot in which a secret agent undertakes a quest against sophisticated and
powerful enemies and encounters a beautiful woman is not protected. The
characters "James Bond," "M," and "Q" are protected.
2. Technical and Factual Works
The analytical balance focuses on the importance of the duplicated material
to the original work and the effect on subsequent authors expressing their
thoughts on the same subject. In fiction works, this leads to expansive
protection for the original author. The balance becomes increasingly acute,
however, in cases of more structured expression and functional objectives.
In this setting, the goals and analytical tools of copyright merge toward
substantially reduced protection.
Relevant distinctions exist between fiction and technical or factual works.
In fiction works, wide variations in writing style, characterization, chronology
and plot are important. These support substantially distinct works based on
identical concepts. Artistic conventions governing expressive choice are not
restrictive. Factual and technical works, in contrast, develop in a structured
environment. A factual history of World War II has a limited choice of
68. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (quoting Holmes
v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1894)).
69. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1140
(9th Cir. 1983).
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major characters, events, chronology and outcome. The restraints increase
as the scope constricts. A technical book describing the theory of relativity
must use particular formulae, interpretations, derivations, orders of analysis
and objectives. Mathematical proofs or descriptions of the theory constrain
choices even further. The limitations are more pronounced if the writer does
not contest prevailing wisdom but desires to author a traditional work.
Structured environments necessarily affect analysis of what similarity is
sufficient for infringement. The existing "history" or structured "objective"
limits the expressive framework. In an infringement case, the issue is not
that the structured environment leaves no room for expressive variations.
That extreme case, if it exists, creates an issue of copyrightability. The
structured environment instead requires greater care in defining the unique
and protected facets of the first work so as not to foreclose or deter sub-
sequent authors who must engage in expression confined by the same limited
structure.
It is possible to grant the first author protection for organization or "plot"
of a history work since this is an important feature of the work. Such
protection, however, would severely and undesirably restrict others who write
on the same subject. In balancing these effects, traditional doctrine denies-
copyright protection for "facts. ' 70 Factual material and historical chronology
are unprotected, available tools of the trade even if one party first discovered
the pertinent fact. This is often explained in terms of a conclusion that there
can be no "authorship" in facts, but this statement substitutes form for
substance. "Facts" and "history" are unprotected because protection would
severely restrict subsequent authorship in a manner disproportionate to the
benefit for the first author.
Similar analyses apply to technical works. These works deal with estab-
lished "facts," defined objectives and a shared, acceptable methodology.
There are few ways to express the theory of relativity in mathematical terms,
and accepted methods must be used for a formal "proof' of the theory.
Neither can be copyrighted. Both have value to the first author, but copyright
protection of the "expression" would severely restrict future authorship on
the subject. Numerous generic conventions and symbols in technical writing
similarly are not protected. In architectural drawings, for example, it would
be harmful to copyright either the use of 90' angles to describe room corners,
or the use of conventional depictions of the window or door. These are
central to the first work, but they are not unique. Given the limited variations
available, barring "copying" of the symbols would hinder, rither than
promote creativity.7'
70. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.11[A]; Gorman, Copyright
Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963).




This does not suggest that there is no copyright protection for factual or
technical works or that unauthorized copying is permitted.7 2 Rather, due to
the nature of the work, copyright draws the line of protection further toward
prohibiting only literal copying of an entire work. This ensures freedom to
use ideas, facts and common symbols, except in the same complex combi-
nation as used by the first author. One authority describes this as requiring
proof of copying of "copyrightable elements."17 3 Infringement occurs only
if those elements are copies that contain protected (protectible) expression.
Significant and substantial similarity may exist without such appropriation,
but does not support a claim of infringement.
The comparison of fiction and technical works documents a basic theme.
Expansive protection for fiction works protects the author and is proper
because it does not substantially restrict subsequent authors. In technical
works, decisions that extend protection beyond literal copying may affect
subsequent authorship. The underlying purpose of copyright remains con-
stant, but the application is different.
[T]hat a work is copyrighted says very little about the scope of its
protection .... As a work embodies more in the way of particularized
expression, it ... receives broader copyright protection.... [The]
"strongest" works [are those] in which fairly complex or fanciful artistic
expressions predominate over relatively simplistic themes and which are
almost entirely products of the author's creativity rather than concom-
itants of those themes.7-
B. Computer Program Infringement
"Value-added" use of a computer program occurs when the second author
does more than literally duplicate the first program, making more than trivial
changes in it. The fact that the second party engaged in independently creative
work requires an analysis of infringement that balances the rights of the
parties and the interests that each represents. Copyrightable aspects of some
programs resemble fiction works and properly fall within an analogous
analytical structure. In other contexts, the character of the program and the
technology requires an analysis and outcome more analogous to technical
works.
72. See Affiliated Hosp. Prods. Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188 (2d
Cir. 1975); Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides Corp., 497 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1981); cf. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675 (Ist Cir. 1967).
73. 1 M. NImmER, supra note 11, § 2.18[A-D].
74. North American, 672 F.2d at 616-17.
[Vol. 62:13
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY INFRINGEMENT
1. Model of Analysis
It is important to clearly identify the competing interests. The copyright
proprietor desires to maintain and maximize statutory rights to control use
of the original work and preparation of derivative works. This personal
objective is supported by social policies to establish economic incentives for
creative work. Two preliminary premises arise. First, the strength of the
copyright claim increases to the extent that the alleged infringement incor-
porates aspects of the work that define its commercial, scientific or creative
value. Second, the strength of the copyright claim increases to the extent
that the conflicting work directly affects identified and realistically important
markets for the work.
The aspects of a program that are most Valuable differ for a video game
than for a statistical analysis program. In one case, aesthetic impact is critical,
while in the other speed and reliability of operations are important. De-
scribing a feature as commercially significant, of course, does not necessarily
mean that it is protected against all subsequent use. Protection might unduly
impinge other interests and to that extent, should be limited.
There is variance in market protections. Protection for the original author
should increase if protection relates to avoiding harm to existing markets,
while it should be reduced if the alleged infringement pertains to markets
that the first developer is unlikely to enter. A desire to establish "compat-
ibility" or to replicate all aspects of an original has a strong effect on the
original market. Compatibility is an effect to exploit markets created by the
first program, supplanting the original. In contrast, market effects of adapt-
ing a program to a computer that cannot be accessed by the original is less
clear, but does affect a market that the original developer is likely to pursue.
Creating a totally new program with new functions or features has a low
impact even if some aspects or methods of the first program are reproduced.
The second party's position strengthens to the extent that foreclosing its
actions creates de facto control over replicating operations of a system. This
flows from the statutory requirement that copyright not extend to processes,
and distinguishes copyright from patent law. The analysis is not equivalent
to the "process-expression" identity analysis, however, since it does not stop
with the conclusion that there are alternative methods of producing the same
operations. The infringement issues examine the degree of preemption. One
author can describe an historical event in many ways, but there is no
copyright protection for the historical fact.
The second party's position also strengthens to the extent that protecting
the copyright owner creates artificial barriers to subsequent work in the field.
This also entails a preemption analysis. Protection of a copyright claim
should be structured to reduce its potential to distort future work on the
same subject. Elements of a work may be construed as idea content of the
program or unprotectible, generic methods if protecting them would signif-
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icantly distort future work. In, this regard, limiting copyright protection so
as to permit unknowing, independent development alone is inadequate. Ab-
sent patent protection, subsequent technology developers have a right to use
aspects of new techniques and ideas central to their science. Especially in a
technical field, the risk of copyright liability creates a chilling effect, inducing
developers to avoid examining earlier work. Subsequent workers need not
operate in ignorance of the work of others, and copyright should be struc-
tured not to induce them to do so. New technology develops with knowledge
of prior work.
As this suggests, the copyright holder's interest is offset by policies to
maintain free use and access to aspects of a work that are or become central
to the field of technology." This reduces protection in direct proportion to
the increasing, general importance of methods, styles of treatments, but this
results from an important distinction between copyright and patent protec-
tion. Patent, with its high entry threshold, protects basic methods. A second
author should be free to selectively use portions of the original that are
central to the field. Many program subroutines are or become "tools of
trade." A programmer who develops an effective method of doing a cal-
culation does not obtain control over this method.
Einstein's discovery of the relationship between energy and matter did not
create a copyright of the formula, even though the discovery was creatively
significant and valuable. Limits are justified to avoid substantially restricting
future scientific work. The analysis is not that no other ways exist to express
75. Substantial similarity incorporates policy considerations that protect third party rights.
The rights of the copyright proprietor, in addition, are subject to the doctrine of fair use, an
equitable doctrine recognized in § 107 of the Copyright Act. Notwithstanding the copyright,
the "fair use" of a copyrighted work is not an infringement. Section 107 contains a non-
exclusive list of factors considered in fair use. These include: (1) the purpose and character of
the use including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount or proportion of the original work that is used; and (4)
the effect of the use on the "potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." The
statute does not specify the relative weight or importance of these or other factors. A leading
treatise suggests that the primary factor is the effect of the use on the potential market for
the original work and whether the alleged fair use and the original work have a similar function.
See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[B]. This approach emphasizes the impact on the
author of the original work. Others emphasize that fair use should be restricted to "productive"
uses that do not substantially affect the market available for the original author. See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal Cit9 Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This second half of the balance focuses on what the user does with the copyrighted work and
protects conduct that provides a social benefit. A productive use entails use of the original to
build another creative work, including a criticism or review. A convergence of productive use
and minimal impact on the original author creates a clear case of fair use. The law relating
to fair use was recently restated in Sony. Sony involved alleged contributory infringement of
motion picture and television copyrights through distribution of video cassette recorder systems
(VCR). The majority emphasized that the copying was for non-profit, private purposes. For
noncommercial use, there is no infringement unless there is proof of a particular harm or that,
if the practice became widespread, it would adversely affect the market for the copyrighted
work. Such harm can be presumed if the use is a commercial use.
[Vol. 62:13
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY INFRINGEMENT
the operation. The focus concerns the degree of distortion that protecting
the first author would impose on future work. In many cases, the "sec-
ondary" works make equal or greater impact and entail significant creativity.
Loss or inhibition of this field of development reflects a major social loss
not always offset by commensurate gains in terms of "first" developer work.
The second party's interests do not justify comprehensive, literal copying,
but rather productive or developmental use. As a result, an additional factor
pertains to the degree of direct copying. If the original was totally copied,
this refutes a claim that the infringer used only important aspects of the
technology and developed its own product. It increases the likelihood that
unique parts of the original were duplicated and that there is a large market
effect.
These are not absolutes. A "degree of effect" analysis applies. The issues
are: (1) how will denying protection affect the program's marketability and
uniqueness, and (2) will a decision to protect the first author preempt and
distort future work in the field?
2. Audiovisual Copies
Audiovisual displays and other output potentially are copyrightable. Most
copyright cases involving program output deal with video games. In the
earliest cases, the infringement included copying all pertinent sights and
sounds. Later cases involved modifications of the original, creating games
that were similar but not identical. In these cases, substantial similarity
standards are analogous to those for fiction works. They preclude copying
of commercially significant and unique elements of the game to the extent
that this can be done without impeding subsequent, conceptually similar
games.
In Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.,7 6
Atari obtained a preliminary injunction against the game "K. C. Munchkin"
which was allegedly copied from Atari's "PAC-MAN." Both games were
"maze-chase" games in which the player moves a character through a maze
pursued by other video characters. In both games a gobbler goes "through
the maze consuming dots and avoiding capture by the [ghost] monsters; by
gobbling a power capsule, the player can reverse the roles [of the gobbler
and ghosts]; and the ultimate goal is to accumulate the most points by
gobbling dots and monsters." 77 The color, structure and appearance of the
mazes, the configuration of escape tunnels for the gobbler, and the color
of the characters differed. The ghost characters, however, had significant
similarities, and the gobblers shared a distinctive V-shaped mouth.
76. 672 F.2d at 607.
77. Id. at 611.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded
that there was sufficient similarity to grant an injunction. The Seventh Circuit
applied an "ordinary observer" test to the question of improper copying.
This approach involved a "dissection" of the works to exclude similarities
based on ideas and "incidents, characters or setting which are as a practical
matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic. '78
Based on this approach, the Seventh Circuit characterized the "ideal" of
PAC-MAN as a maze chase game in which various aspects of the game were
scenes a faire protected only against identical reproduction if at all. There
was, however, an infringement in a substantial appropriation of the PAC-
MAN characters.
The expression of the central figures as a "gobbler" and the pursuit
figures as "ghost monsters" distinguishes PAC-MAN from conceptually
similar video games .... PAC-MAN'S particular artistic interpretation
of the game was designed to ... appeal to a nonviolent player person-
ality. The game as such, however, does not dictate the use of a "gobbler"
and "ghost monsters."
North American not only adopted the same basic characters but also
portrayed them in a manner which made K.C. Munchkin appear sub-
stantially similar to PAC-MAN. 79
Given "substantial similarity" in the characters, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that other specific differences in the games were immaterial. The
"ordinary observer test" focuses on overall impression, rather than technical
difference. This is especially true for a video game because users are generally
undiscriminating about subtle differences. The infringing game copies the
"total concept and feel" of the original work.
In contrast, in Atari v. Amusement World Inc. ,8o the Maryland district
court concluded that there were insufficient similarities in the games of
"Meteors" and "Asteroids." Both games involved a central figure, portrayed
as a spaceship, which destroyed floating rocks by firing projectiles at the
rocks. There were differences in the design and color of the rocks. The court
concluded that the defendant had copied the idea for "Meteors" from
"Asteroids," but that the similarity was due to the copied idea, rather than
expression. "[The similarities are] inevitable, given the requirements of the
idea of a game involving a spaceship combating space rocks and given the
technical demands of the medium of a video game." 8 ' Discounting similarities
78. Id. at 616 (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). In
Alexander, the court used this formula to identify aspects of a literary work that did not
warrant copyright protection. The North American court explained that this formula could also
be used to identify aspects of games which should not be protected. North American, 672 F.2d
at 616.
79. North American, 672 F.2d at 617-18.
80. 547 F. Supp. at 222.
81. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
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based on the idea of the game, the court concluded that the differences
(e.g., color and design) were significant and contradicted a finding of sub-
stantially similar expression.
These results reflect the level of abstraction used in defining the idea of
the game.12 The court in Amusement World could have characterized the
idea as a game involving the destruction of threatening objects by a central
figure. Under this characterization, the choice of similar objects (spaceships
and rocks) might be an infringement. The North American court, in contrast,
could have defined that idea as involving ghost figures and a gobbler in a
maze. Under that view, the characters are unprotected. These recharacteri-
zations would alter the outcome in both cases since they redefine the pro-
tectible expression.
The cases illustrate the elasticity of the idea-expression distinction applied
to computer programs resembling fiction works. The results are not arbitrary
or inconsistent. In defining an appropriate level of abstraction for the idea
of a work, the court balances protection of the original author against
resulting restraints on subsequent authors. One aspect is to identify com-
mercially or artistically central elements of the first work and to determine
what effect protecting these would have on subsequent works. In PAC-
MAN, the gobbler character was central and had become well known and
widely recognized. A level of abstraction that did not protect this character
would in effect allow the game to be appropriated. Even if the character is
protected, however, there is a wide latitude for subsequent works. These
can include ghosts and gobblers since both figures can be drawn in numerous
ways. The "Asteroids" rocks, in contrast, were less significant to that game
than the concept of a space encounter with objects to be destroyed. Protecting
the rock designs would restrict subsequent works since there are limited ways
to draw a two-dimensional rock. Protecting the concept of a space encounter
would respond to the commercially valuable content, but would be even
more restrictive of future works.
3. Source and Object Code Similarity
Source and object code are copyrightable, but the structured and limited
language of program code makes distinctions between idea and expression
difficult. The functional purpose of the program and a shared technical
objective of speed and efficiency of performance restrict "expressive" op-
tions. While some code creates expressive output, other code directs machine
performance of specific functions. This code is not chosen for aesthetic
value. Given agreement about function, there is an accepted goal to create
code that optimizes performance. These characteristics increase the risk that
copyright protection of the first work will adversely affect development of
subsequent works.
82. See also Williams Elecs., 568 F. Supp. at 1274; Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 466.
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The infringement issue is not whether this environment justifies denial of
all protection. Rather, as with factual and technical works, the nature of
the art limits the scope of protection that-.is consistent with appropriate
policy. Programmers may use different methods or sequential operations to
achieve intended results. An emphasis on this, however, avoids the policy
issue if the purported conclusion is that subsequent programmers should not
be free to use an identical sequence or method. There is a need to protect
the original but to avoid preempting other applications of technology. If
there are similarities in two programs, the analysis of whether the similarities
are sufficient for infringement requires consideration of competing interests
relating to both the original developer and the ability of third parties to
engage in technology development based at least in part on ideas and in-
novations in prior work.
An infringement based on substantially similar code was found in Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Strohon.s3 Strohon dealt with the video game PAC-MAN. The
infringing work was a modification and speed up kit. The insertion of the
kit according to instructions speeds the movement of the characters in the
maze game, but also eliminated the PAC-MAN characters, themselves, re-
placing them with other figures. Compliance with less than all of the in-
structions would enhance speed, while retaining the original characters. At
least some purchasers of the kit used it in this latter manner.
The lawsuit was against the distributor of the kit. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that there was no infringe-
ment of the audiovisual copyright since the "intended" modifications in the
kit removed the PAC-MAN characters and thus did not reproduce the
protected display. The distributor was not liable for uses that retained the
audiovisual display."
The court nevertheless held that the object code of the PAC-MAN game
was copyrightable and was infringed by the code in the modification kits.
[Eighty-nine percent] of the 16,000 bytes [were] identically repro-
duced .... 13,382 contain actual sequencing instructions, as distinct from
data that appears directly on the screen .... Midway's experts identified
three long strings of identical locations.
The degree of similarity ... is substantial. [Tihere is virtually an
infinite number of ways to write . .. program instructions that will
produce the ... game sequencing .... It is thus not at all necessary
that the assembly code or object code phases of a computer program
that would operate a maze chase game track the PAC-MAN program.5
83. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
84. Id. at 748-49.
85. Id. at 752-53 (footnotes omitted).
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The court's analysis was incomplete. The court assumed that all of the
object code was protected so long as other programs could be written to
operate a maze game. This confuses copyrightability analysis with an analysis
of whether copyrightable elements were infringed. The court's approach
adopts a very general concept of an "idea" and concludes that the entire
code and sequence of instructions is expression. This implicit assumption
was reached without analysis. There was no examination of the extent of
similarity inherent in any chase game or of the relationship between the code
and the unprotected elements of the visual game. The court made no effort
to identify what code, if any, might be standard in the trade.
Despite the deficiencies, the decision is correct. The modification kits
clearly were oriented to compete in a market consistent with probable future
development of PAC-MAN. This becomes especially clear if one focuses on
the apparent intent that the kit be used to speed up PAC-MAN without
replacing copyrighted characters. In any event, the kit exploited the PAC-
MAN program base. The developers did little innovative work on the basic
PAC-MAN program since there was an over eighty percent similarity in
code. There was no proof that describing this level of appropriation as
infringement limits development of other games or that the copied code was
central to video game development.
The omitted analyses are essential to resolve close cases "in a manner that
adequately protects third party developers. An infringement exists only if
similarity in code is divorced of standard phrases or repeated ideas in the
second program. Separating ideas and expression entails a policy choice
defining the degree of protection justified for a particular work. If artistic
expression in the program (text, visual images) is not at issue, only the most
proximate copying and virtually complete similarity should be actionable.
An eighty percent reproduction meets this criteria.
D. Structure and Sequence: Computerization
Even with inadequate similarity in code, infringement can exist in the
reproduction of program sequence or structure. In copyright, this requires
a conclusion that the sequence or structure of the program constitutes pro-
tected expression independent of a particular code. Sequence and structure
are important aspects of a program that may contribute to performance,
speed and capability. Protecting structure, rather than aesthetic appeal or
code, however, risks substantial restraints on subsequent design and devel-
opment. It grants the copyright proprietor some control over methods or
processes of machine operation. Control in this form can be justified, but
the justification must be closely examined in each case.
This issue arises in transformations of manual or mechanical methods and
procedures into computer environments. Insofar as technology rather than
games are involved, the transformation process entails adapting methods
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and organization from a manual or other statement of procedure into com-
mands for a computer. In one view, this represents mere translation from
one language to another (English into "computer"), even though the process
actually entails quite different activities since a computer operates in ways
that are distinct from those suitable for humans. 6 An 'alternative conception
regards the transformation as analogous to adapting a fiction novel into a
motion picture. The copyright proprietor claims control of both activities.
As is often true in dealing with computer law issues, easy analogies distort
significant distinctions. In this case, there are differences between converting
methods and systems, rather than characters and plots. Copyright does not
protect methods of calculation, processes of analysis or other procedures,
but only extends to expression. The plot of a novel identifiably transformed
to a motion picture or the characters list in a play represents a taking of
protected expression from the original author. By contrast, converting an
operations manual or system of computation to a computer transfers the
method and process. A judgment must be made about when this unprotectible
element of a technology can be protected by the original "author." Because
of the statutory mandate, the judgment cannot grant de facto control over
the process or method to the original author in the guise of protecting against
adaptive infringement of copyright.
The earliest case dealing with sequence and structure was Synercom Tech-
nology, Inc. v. University Computing Co. 87 In Synercom, the defendants
marketed a structural analysis program with an input format innovated by
Synercom. The Synercom format involved manual organization of data prior
to entry in a computer. Forms and procedures were published. Since Sy-
nercom's computer analysis program was a commercial success, defendants
designed their analysis program to accept input identical to that used in the
Synercom product. This was done with a preprocessor computer program.
The FORTRAN statements in the preprocessor program were "derived di-
rectly and precisely from the copyrighted manual card formats."88 Synercom
argued that this was an infringing translation of its copyrighted work.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas char-
acterized the issue as whether the "sequence and ordering" copied by defend-
ant was protected expression or unprotected idea. It held that the sequence
was an unprotectible idea, analogizing it to an automobile manufacturer's
selection of a figure-H format for manual transmissions. "The pattern...
may be expressed in several different ways .... [b]ut the copyright protects
copying of the particular expressions ... and does not prohibit another
86. See, e.g., E. F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn.
1985); Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
87. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
88. Id. at 1012.
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manufacturer from marketing a car using the same pattern." 9 The allegations
of infringement were an effort to control reproduction of a process for
entering data into a program.
The court's alternative holding was that, if the sequence was expression,
the format was not copyrightable. There was then an identity between idea
and expression.
Here if order and sequence is the expression, the skilled effort is not
separable, for the form, arrangement, and combination is itself the
intellectual conception involved. It would follow that only to the extent
the expressions involve stylistic creativity above and beyond the bare
expression of sequence and arrangement, should they be protected....
The "idea or principle" behind the forms ... and the "method or
system" involved in them, would be no more or less than the formats.9
The court's conception of the idea in the data formats encompassed the
entire format.
In Synercom, the particular input format was not the only method available
for entering data into a structural analysis program. The defendants elected
to seek "compatibility" with Synercom since it was a market leader. If
denied the right to do so, their market entry would have been impeded even
though the processing program core of their product was not similar to the
Synercom program. The decision embodies a judgment that this effect is
not justified where the second author did not merely copy the first work,
but authored a new work in a different technological environment as part
of a much larger activity. This policy choice permits a new program in direct
competition with the original. Protecting the Synercom format, however,
would preempt a process for data entry and might distort future development.
Based on the court's conclusion, the format can be freely replicated in any
subsequent work.
Synercom involved a substantially new work. The preprocessor designed
to accommodate particular data entry procedures represented a small part
of the larger program. The defendant creatively designed its own product
and translated the plaintiff's manual operations into a computer environ-
ment. The circumstances yielded a strong case for protecting the second
developer's use. The scope of reproduction was limited to a particular feature
of the original and did not involve mere literal copying, but adaptive work
of some creativity. While market competition resulted, the products never-
theless were distinguishable based on the larger, uncopied analysis programs
to which the data ehtry process attached. The original author did not con-
template development of a new analysis program such as the one used by
defendant.
89. Id. at 1013.
90. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
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Translation from manual to computer contexts is an economically signif-
icant activity. Decisions about such translation define the scope of the original
copyright in arguable "traditional" works and, equally important, the range
of material available for the program developers to engage in technologically
and commercially significant development. The adaptive environment resem-
bles transforming a fiction book into a motion picture, but the direct in-
volvement of technology and methods significantly alters the analysis. In
cases dealing with such technology, the computer developer directly trans-
forms the forms of organization, the calculation and the performed oper-
ations to a structure and schemata consistent with computer operations.
Granting the first author protection of these is not equivalent to protecting
the plot developed by a novelist since there is not only a statutory bar against
protecting processes, but the practical fact that protection distorts future
development of technology. Creation of an original work describing a method
of calculus does not give the author control of that method in all environ-
ments. Even patent protection cannot extend to mathematical formulae and
operations as such. 91
The issues about protection close as the degree of detailed translation
increases, although even when there is literally exact reproduction of an
initial procedure, the second party's rights remain strong. Williams v. Arnd9 2
demonstrates the risks in accepting the premise that the first author's pro-
tection extends to computer applications of methods. In Arndt, the Mas-
sachusetts district court misplaced the analysis, protecting procedures, methods
and results in the name of protected expression.
Arndt involved a system for commodities trading developed and marketed
by plaintiff. The system was described in manuals that the court held to be
copyrightable and protected. The manuals outline a detailed, step-by-step
set of procedures in commodities investment decisions. Defendant created
software that achieved the same analyses and produced similar results, but
benefited from the speed of the computer and the fact that automatic
calculations can more rapidly control trading decisions.
The defendant argued that the source code of the alleged infringing pro-
gram was a "new and different expression of the idea of a market trading
system." The court rejected this "novel" argument, treating the copyrighted
manuals as a detailed flow chart used by the infringing programmer. The
court's analysis accepted, without close scrutiny, the analogy between com-
puter adaptation and translation from a foreign language. It assumed that
the programmer's role was analogous to the medieval scribe, merely tran-
scribing the work of another.
[A] source code is not an entirely new, unique expression of ideas.
91. Id. at 1012.
92. 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985).
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The computer programmer writes in computer language the commands
necessary to implement the direction provided in the narrative. The
computer language can be compared to any foreign language .... To a
skilled programmer, the conversion of known input ... the mathematical
expressions needed and the methods of transferring those expressions
into computer language is necessarily a mere clerical function.93
It is probably correct to emphasize that, without more, transformation of
expression into source code does not create a distinct, new work any more
than translation into French creates a new book. This leaves unaddressed
the difficult issue of defining what constitutes expression and deciding whether
that was taken. In this regard, the court clearly confused processing capability
and outcomes of calculations with protected expression. At most, the original
copyright protects expression, but cannot give the author control of analyses
that create particular outcomes. Yet the court implied that this was exactly
the character of the alleged infringement. It observed that one objectionable
feature of the "translation" was that it enabled an experienced trader to
more rapidly reach a decision than did the manual procedure. Similarly,
while "the skilled programmer can provide flexibility, neatness, and clarity
in arranging the order of the system, the programmer . . . does not express
creativity, imagination, independent thought and uniqueness." 94
If order and clarity of arrangement are not the expression, what is? The
court makes abundantly clear that the outcome and underlying analysis
system was protected. In this regard it is clearly wrong.
[The] source code contained similarities which generated identical signals
in the vast majority of comparisons. Here, Arndt merely translated
Williams [sic] work from English into computer language....
The most graphic evidence of substantial similarity was the comparison
of the FTM with both programs Arndt had offered .... Picking a
commodity-live cattle .. .James Stack went through a step-by-step
process of both systems .... The FTM result was essentially the same
as the result reached by running the Trend Counter Trend system .... 9
What the court describes as the most striking example of substantial similarity
is, in fact, no evidence of actionable similarity at all. Copyright does not
deal with or protect analytical results, nor should it. The first author of a
new theory or computation system does not obtain control over the results
of the system even under patent law.
The Arndt result is supportable, if at all, only because of the detailed
character of the copyrighted manuals and the defendant's literal and com-
prehensive reproduction of the operations they describe. Even then, the
preoccupation with the creation of comparable "results" in output indicates
93. Id. at 577.
94. Id. at 578.
95. Id. at 579.
1986]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that thecourt failed to focus on the protectible portion of the manual, if
any such existed. Sequence and structure of a complex program can be
protected expression to the extent that literal copying occurs, but care must
be exercised to avoid protecting analytical methods that create desired results.
The clear risk entails foreclosure of technically and economically significant
activity in the name of protected expression. Courts must clearly and ex-
plicitly balance competing rights. To avoid improperly foreclosing important
activity, at least three conditions should coexist before protection to the first
author applies in cases where no identifiable character, story line or item
of literary fiction value is taken. These are: (1) there must be comprehensive
transcription of a complex and lengthy product and not merely selective
taking of portions of the technology; (2) the result must be directly com-
petitive with the original in a market into which the first author is likely to
enter; and (3) the transcription must represent the majority or essential core
of the original and the new product creating direct and pervasive competition
based on the first author's work. These conditions were not met in Synercom
and the court properly rejected the copyright claim against the input format.
In Arndt, the apparent facts more closely support the outcome, but the
court's analysis deals inadequately with analysis of expression to assess the
outcome.
E. Structure and Sequence: Adapting Programs
The three transcription factors balance the rights of the original author
and the value-added developer. Their application is demonstrated in a related
form of computer program adaptation work. Synercom and Arndt deal with
computerization of manual processes. Other cases deal with new programs
based on existing software. This kind of secondary development entails either
of two distinct formats. In one, the second developer examines the first
program, adapting some methods and techniques, but adding additional and
different personalized functions and coding. This creates a new program
with distinctive expressive and performance characteristics. The second com-
mon process attempts to recreate and reproduce the original program and
operations, adapting them to a new computer language or hardware envi-
ronment.
Both methodologies create valuable products and entail complex creative
work. The two differ in the extent and character of reliance on the original
work and in the manner in which the new product impacts markets for the
old. The developer who selectively uses proven approaches and aspects of
the first, while adding significant and nontrivial personal value, merits greater
protection than the literal transcriptionist.
Assessing the copyright status of either approach and the many interstitial
variations that occur requires consideration of what elements of a program
are protected and what elements are not. Copyright does not protect what
the program does, how it conducts particular operations, or what analytical
[Vol. 62:13
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY INFRINGEMENT
outcomes the calculations create. Copyright protects expressions. Expression
in a program includes the source and object code. Extending beyond that,
the original programmer arguably should control some adaptive works even
though literal reproduction of code does not occur. The mere fact that each
type of adaptive computer work uses new and divergent coding does not
insulate the second developer. Protection not based on code similarity, how-
ever, cannot be transported to protection of calculations, methods or out-
comes. The protectible features of the complex program beyond its particular
code are the organization, sequence and other "expressive" structural char-
acteristics. At some level, at least, close and comprehensive replication of
the sequence and structure of a complex program can be barred without
substantially deterring future development work since it is seldom essential
to use a large, complex system in its entirety in order to develop new products
and technologies.
The cases deal with transcriptions whose effect is to transport an entire,
complex program to a new hardware environment. The translation substan-
tially replicates the original, with no modifications to improve or alter
performance. The decisions protect the structure and sequence of the complex
original program, if there is evidence of literal and comprehensive replication.
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,9 the first
program ("Dentalab") was developed by the predecessor of Whelan working
with the defendant. The dispute focused on defendant's subsequent program
for the IBM PC which was developed by modifying the code of the original.
It substantially duplicated the video display and operating functions of the
original and was sold under the name "DENTLAB."
The two programs did not contain similar code, because they were written
in different programming language adapted for a different computer. As
the court acknowledged, even if literal reproduction is desired, it is inefficient
and may be impossible to simply transcribe code from one language to
another. The process instead "requires a study of the manner in which the
information flows from one function to another. Once this is understood,
one may copy this exact manner of operation for use in a computer that
responds to commands written in a different source code language." ' 97 The
infringement claim focused on similarity in sequence and operation.
In Whelan, the claims of the original author were factually strong. The
defendant desired a literal copy of the first program in a new environment,
duplicating the operations of the original, rather than developing a different
and distinct program. To users, the products appear identical. Visual and
interactive similarity was enhanced by a marketing strategy using a similar
name and suggesting that the new product was the original adapted to a
96. 609 F. Supp. at 1307. See Davis, supra note 42; Chertok, supra note 42.
97. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1321.
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less expensive environment. The market for the new program was substantial.
The original author had actually developed its own product based on its
original program for this same market.
The defendant's activities did not clearly present socially valuable, value-
added use unless translation itself is separately valuable. The defendant
attempted to capitalize on the reputation of the original, rather than construct
a new product. It made no attempt to make substantive changes in the
original. There was no proof or allegation that ability to replicate the entire
structure of the complex first program was essential to continued develop-
ment in the field.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found an infringement of the original program based on a decision that the
method of operation was the copyrighted expression: "The 'expression of
the idea' in a software computer program is the manner in which the program
operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, cal-
culating, retaining, correlating, and' producing useful information either on
a screen, print-out or by audio communication. " 98
The court's view of protected expression reflects a broad conception of
the idea of the program. The idea apparently consisted simply of the notion
of a computer program for "operating a dental laboratory." In a fiction
novel, the equivalent defines the idea of War and Peace as a "novel about
society." The definition creates expansive protection of the original author
and is unnecessary to the result.
Divorced of the strong factual case for the original author, the court's
description of the protected expression as the manner in which the machine
"operates," "calculates" and "receives" data defines the process itself. The
error is like that in Arndt. On balance, however, the result is best interpreted
as a judgment that the strength of the original author's claims outweighed
constraints against protecting machine processes.
A similar, but better focused analysis occurred in SAS Institute Inc. v. S
& H Computer Systems, Inc.99 SAS involved an infringement of a multi-
98. Id. at 1320.
As this Article went to press, in an opinion consistent with the analysis recomended here,
the Third Circuit affirmed the Whelan decision. Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab-
oratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986). The court expressly acknowledged that the
distinction between expression and idea involves practical line drawing to balance incentives
for the author and flexibility for third party development. Expression consists of any aspect
of a program not essential to its purpose or function. Here, the purpose was to aid in efficient
operation of the dental lab. The organization and structure of the program was expression
because there are many ways to organize a program for this function. In treating organization
as expression, the court emphasized the "comprehensiveness and complexity" of the file struc-
ture. Id. at 1243. A less complex organization might not constitute expression. A finding of
infringement was supportable because of the virtual identity of five important subroutines or
sequences from the first work. The Third Circuit avoided any indication that expression entails
the way a program "operates" or "controls" the computer. Id. at 1235-40.
99. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
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faceted statistics program widely used in the social sciences. At the time of
the alleged infringement, the program was available only for IBM computers,
although SAS had begun development on versions to operate on Digital
"VAX" and other computers.
The infringement involved unauthorized development by S & H of a
statistical package for operation on a VAX computer where it was viewed
and modified by programmers developing the surrogate. The resulting "new"
program was not identical to SAS, but closely followed the complex orga-
nization and structure of the SAS program and contained some identical
code.
The factual circumstances strongly favored the original developer. The
second product affected a market that SAS was preparing to enter. The
translation replicated all significant statistical analyses and data formats in
SAS. It encompassed aspects that made SAS unique and contributed to its
market value. S & H made no significant effort to improve the original or
modify it beyond the changes necessitated by the new machine. S & H simply
reproduced, insofar as possible, all attributes and characteristics of SAS.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
correctly concluded that the S & H program was an infringing copy of the
SAS program. The infringement involved both substantial similarity in code
and substantial similarity in structure and organization. The court found at
least forty-four documented instances of literal duplication of code. It con-
cluded that additional literal duplications were erased after the dispute arose.
Erasures and modifications did not "represent any effort to improve the S
& H product, but rather represent an effort to mask and disguise evidence
of copying."100 The S & H product incorporated undocumented and incom-
plete options identical to options in the SAS program, but which served no
purpose in either program. The similar code did not reflect similarity of
idea, but of expression.
S & H presented no evidence that the functional abilities, ideas, methods,
and processes of SAS could be expressed in only very limited ways. On
the contrary, the Court finds that to the extent that similarities between
SAS and the S & H product have existed, they represent unnecessary,
intentional duplication of expression.'0'
The court's standard incorporates the idea-expression identity test, but the
reference to unnecessary and intentional duplication creates a potentially
useful focus. Copying occurs when the second programmer chooses to du-
plicate, rather than create in a context where a realistic choice exists. Re-
petitive choices to duplicate contradict claimed new product development.
The court found actionable similarity in structure and organization. S &
H alleged that it adopted the SAS structure and then independently developed
100. Id. at 823.
101. Id. at 825.
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code. The trial court concluded that this procedure was not actually followed,
but even if it had been, duplication of a complex organization created
substantial similarity of expression. The detailed organization and structure
of the SAS program was protected expression.
The SAS court relied on Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc.'0 2 Meredith involved an infringement of a textbook where the second
author used a detailed outline of the original and created text within the
outline. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Meredith concluded:
I find ... an extensive taking of the structure and topical sequence...
in addition to the eleven percent admittedly plagiarized .... [While] the
Meredith text contains some independent ideas ... some independent
research, some additional topics and some different structure, the topic
selection and arrangement of the Meredith book are in substantial part
the result of copying ... not attributable to independent effort by
Meredith or the necessary result of limited possibilities for organizing
and presenting the material to be covered.103
The analysis was proper in this case. Defining organization and structure
as expression, rather than as unprotected idea, is appropriate if the order
and organization of material are essential attributes of the unique value of
the first work. This was true in Meredith. In a textbook, organization and
order of presentation are significant, perhaps more important than textual
expression. This importance defines the first author's interest in protecting
the structure. In complex computer programs such as SAS, the structure
may be less obviously relevant to a user, but is important to the work.
A conclusion that structure is expression is appropriate only if the dupli-
cated structure encompasses the detail and entirety of the organization of a
complex work. The organization infringed is not general structure, but the
cumulated series of specific decisions made in organizing a complex mass
of material. This is an important limitation essential to preserving flexibility
for subsequent authors. The level of specificity at which structure becomes
expression varies, but cannot be set at a general level without significantly
inhibiting subsequent work. A complex structure duplicated to a significant
degree of detail represents infringement. As the court in SAS noted, a
complex program presents a "virtually endless series of decisions as to how
to carry out the assigned task."' 4 Duplication of some structural elements
and organizational features is neither surprising, nor actionable. Compre-
hensive duplication of virtually the entire organization, including unnecessary
detail, infringes the complex structure.
102. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
103. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385, 386 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (emphasis in original).
104. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 825.
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The duplication of structure must not be based on independent effort or
necessity arising from the subject matter and alternatives for effectively
organizing information. This defines the strength of the third party's claim.
SAS is characteristic of the extreme case of copying as contrasted to necessary
use. A market leader is selected as a "model" for the new work. Within
the detailed outline of the original, some new text and some research is
added. Slight name and reference changes may conceal the scope of dupli-
cation. The overall process transparently seeks to reproduce the original with
minimal modifications.
These considerations were important in SAS and weighed toward a con-
clusion that infringement occurred. The combination of verbatim copying
and unnecessary design choices that duplicate the original program created
a similar result in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America.05 In
Uniden, defendant reverse-engineered software central to a two-way, land
based mobile radio transmission system. Uniden developed its new system
by disassembling the competing Johnson software, reproducing it in readable
form and studying flow charts of the program and hardware service manuals.
The Uniden product used a Hitachi microprocessor, while the Johnson
product used an Intel microprocessor. The microchips have different per-
formance requirements and capabilities.
As in SAS, the Minnesota district court found an infringement involving
both literal recreation of the original program and in numerous design choices
orienting the "new" program to be organized identically to the original. As
in other cases, these "development" choices were intended to reduce inde-
pendent design costs and create a compatible system.
The court found substantial similarity under both the ordinary observer
test and what it described as the iterative approach.106 The court acknowl-
edged that transferring a program to another language and hardware envi-
ronment is not comparable to translating a book, but entails greater analysis
and adaptation of underlying organization. In addition, "disassembled ver-
sions of the same program would not exhibit line-for-line correlation ....
For these reasons ... line-by-line comparison [is] unconvincing."'' 0 7 There
nevertheless was substantial verbatim copying, including the reproduction of
unnecessary code from the Johnson software. This reflects duplication rather
105. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
106. The approach requires proof that the original was "used" in preparing the copy and
"that the defendant's work is an iterative reproduction, that is, one produced by iterative or
exact duplication of substantial portions of the copyrighted work." Note, Copyright Infringe-
ment of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L.
Rav. 1264, 1294-1300 (1984). The court implies that this approach shifts from the ordinary
observer's impressions of total concept and feel "to an analysis of the 'quantitative and
qualitative evidence of similarities' as gauged by the court's evaluation of expert testimony.
The fiction of the lay observer is thus abandoned in favor of an analysis of similarities and
differences." Uniden, 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
107. Uniden, 623 F. Supp. at 1498.
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than independent development. Thirty-eight or forty-four identifiable sub-
routines of the original product were duplicated by Uniden. Many of the
duplications were unnecessary.
The case deals with design choices which affect coding similarity. Uniden
throughout chose designs identical to Johnson choices. In one situation, the
choice involved duplicating a data item or "word" described as "Barker
code" which both sending and receiving units must identify for communi-
cation to be established. "[I]n order to make its radios compatible ...
Uniden was required to and did copy this aspect of the EFJ program. ' ' ' °s
Although the court concluded that compatibility does not justify compre-
hensive duplication of the original,' °9 it held that the central role of this
seven digit numerical word in the technology permitted duplication even
though Johnson did not merely use a word from published journals, but
adapted known forms to its own program. ' 0 Like scenes a faire, this specific
aspect of the program was too limited and central to the technology to be
separately protected.
Cumulation of other design choices nevertheless created infringement.
Uniden "decided" to use the same processing rate used by Johnson to sample
incoming data and establish synchronization and detection in communica-
tions. This choice was made even though the original speed was based on
limitations of the Intel chip not found in the Hitachi. The higher speed
possible in the Hitachi also was preferable to eliminate error. The essence
of the infringement, however, was not any particular choice, but the cu-
mulation of unnecessary replication. The terms and technology are esoteric,
but the court's discussion suggests the theme:
[A]n LTR-compatible software program could have been written without
verbatim duplication .... The H-matrix ... for example, can be con-
figured in any of 32 different ways .... [E]xact duplication ... was
not the "only and essential" means of achieving compatibility. The
Barker word was of necessity identical in both codes, but [duplication]
of Barker word correlation techniques and sampling rates was not....
[W]hile both plaintiff and defendant employed the "shifting correlator"
scheme of Barker word detection, other ways of achieving the same task
are recognized in the industry. . . . In addition, rather than duplicate
EFJ's inverse H-matrix, the defendant could have accomplished the same
task by inverting the check sum.... [D]efendant did not deny that more
than one possible configuration of the sample error table could have
been created....
108. Id. at 1493-94.
109. The court relied on the two Apple decisions discussed earlier, see supra text accom-
panying notes 43-50, but properly did not examine the case as if there were no right to create
a compatible system. In this case, "comprehensive" copying was not essential to compatibility.
110. Uniden, 623 F. Supp. at 1491.
111. Id. at 1502-03.
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In these and other respects, the recurrent decision was to duplicate, rather
than create. The design choices were not required by compatibility needs,
and other compatible programs existed without infringement. The cumulative
effect of numerous, equally acceptable design and structural options creates
a situation precluding repetitive work in the field. Other developers remain
free to compete and produce similar functional programs or systems, but
"may not do so by pirating plaintiff's mobile radio programs, if an alter-
native is available." " 2 The readily available alternatives involve systems where
a significant portion of the design choices reflect independent expression,
rather than copying.
Analyses involving transportation to different hardware and language en-
-vironments require sensitivity to when the actions of the second party should
be protected, rather than precluded. The court deals in not only uncharted
waters but a field defined by complex technology and necessary, permissible
overlap and duplication. Given the protected objective of creating similar
processes in the new environment, the code and structure of two programs
will necessarily be similar. Accepted styles, necessary operations and known
subroutines contribute to similarity that cannot be described as actionable
without severely impinging future technology development. In the new hard-
ware, new language setting, these similarities nevertheless may be the only
available benchmarks of comparison between the programs.
As a result, courts should be cautious in attributing any similarity-to the
illicit copying, rather than to permitted similarity of function and objectives
even if the alleged infringer knew the code of the original. The risk is that
a failure to exercise caution will grant the first author an effective monopoly
over processes and methods, a result prohibited by the Copyright Act.
In Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman," '3 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York found a lack of infringement in two
programs designed to permit use of personal computers as prompters for
television. The case also involved trade secrecy questions since the source
of information about the original program entailed the fact that the second
developer was initially associated with the first company.
The new program created prompter capability for an IBM computer,
whereas the original was used in Atari computers. Because the IBM lacks
graphics hardware present in the Atari, the IBM programming was signifi-
cantly more complex and lengthy. Despite the use of different languages,
the court nevertheless noted a similarity between the two. It concluded that
this was not infringement even though the program was prepared in a format
similar to that found in the SAS case. The similarities were of ideas, rather
than expression.
112. Id. at 1504.
113. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Notwithstanding these facts, there is no testimony establishing any
unique expression based on the existence of the VPS-500 modules, since
the same modules would be an inherent part of any prompting program.
Their order and organization can be more closely analogized to the
concept of wheels for the car rather than the intricacies of a particular
suspension system. Moreover, in contrast to . SAS Institute, [where]
the defendant had "slavishly copied" plaintiff's work, such copying is
impossible here, given the differences between the hardware for the Atari
and IBM computers."'
Hoffman suggests the effect of subtle distinctions in replication and the
absence of "slavish" duplication resulting in reproduction of not only nec-
essary organization, but unnecessary features. Hoffman, more importantly,
reflects the need to protect the third party in addition to protecting the
"original" author. Even where there is knowledge of the original work and
similarity in design results, a case for infringement requires detailed repetition
of the original in the face of abundant, unexercised options.
In Whelan, SAS, and Uniden, there is a clear policy choice allocating
control of software translations to new computer environments. The defend-
ants engaged in no new development except as that applies to translation
itself. The conclusion was that a translation, while technically difficult and
valuable, is not protected. The second party cannot literally trace the original.
The original author controls commercial translations of its program.
Adaptation to a new environment seeks to implement in full detail the
original work and incorporate its unique elements. The adapted environment
ordinarily represents a realistic potential market for the original author. The
second author does not add to the program. Use of the entire structure of
a complex program is not essential to continued development of the art.
This same result, however, does not apply if the translation involves sub-
stantial developmental work or where only portions of the original are
translated and added to in the new environment. Merely general or generic
similarity also is not prevented.
F. User Modifications
The foregoing discussion focused on value-added development of products
for commercial markets. Issues about the rights of a third party to modify
or enhance a program also arise where the changes are made by a person
in lawful possession of the program, but with no intention to market the
enhanced product. Modifications for personal use occur in various forms.
In one, the user of the copy makes relatively minor changes that facilitate
use in a particular computer. This is common in microcomputers because
of the uncertain and incomplete compatibility of mass market programs in
114. Id. at 616 (footnotes omitted).
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the numerous hardware systems that are currently available. In other cases,
the user's changes are intended to enhance the utility of the program to it,
such as by increasing speed or the ability to interface with another program.
In many programs, the capability to make modifications is provided in the
program.
Issues of value-added use occur when the user intends no distribution.
Modifications without remarketing affect the copyright owner's economic
interests only if the modifications reduce the user's incentive to purchase
additional products from the author. Absent this effect, the personal mod-
ifications should be treated as privileged development work or as a fair use.
Interests in third party innovation outweigh concerns about the copyright
owner's market in most cases.
For ordinary works, the copyright proprietor cannot control use of a copy
if no unauthorized reproduction occurs." 5 The owner of a book may under-
line, cut and paste, and loan the book without liability. For computer
programs, owner modifications are dealt with in section 117 of the Copyright
Act. Section 117 gives the copy owner the right to make an additional copy
of the program as an essential step in the utilization of the program in a
computer and to prepare a copy for "archival purposes." The copies must
be destroyed if the owner's possession of the program becomes no longer
lawful. Section 117 also gives the copy owner a right to make an adaptation
of the program if the adaptation is "essential" to use of the program in a
computer. The modified program cannot be transferred without permission
of the copyright proprietor. It must be destroyed if the copy owner's pos-
session ceases to be lawful.
The Copyright Act does not provide similar rights for lessees and licensees.
Even for owners, the right to make an adaptation is limited to "essential"
steps for use of the program in a computer. This phrase includes adjustments
designed to optimize personal use of the program. The focus should be on
essential adaptations, with reference being made to the owner's intended
use, rather than to a limited notion of the absolute necessity that merely
enables the owner to load and operate the program.
While section 117 refers to modifications "essential" to use in a computer,
the language was adopted from recommendations in the CONTU report that
suggested broader applicability:
[A] right to make those changes necessary to enable the use for which
it was both sold and purchased should be provided. The conversion of
a program from one higher-level language to another to facilitate use
would fall within this right, as would the right to add features to the
program that were not present at the time of rightful acquisition. These
115. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.18[A]. Cf. S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst. Inc.
568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
19861
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
rights .. .could only be exercised so long as they did not harm the
interests of the copyright proprietor."'
Most personal modifications do not adversely affect the original author
in any manner accommodated in copyright law. Even if the user "owns"
the copy, however, the right to modify that copy exists only insofar as it
does not harm the copyright proprietor. This refers to effects on the com-
mercial market for the work.
A confluence of market effect and license, rather than ownership, limits
modification of commercial video game programs. In video games used in
arcades, the user is licensed to display the program for a fee to the public.
For most games, initial popularity decreases as players become accustomed
to the game. In such context, the user may desire to modify the program
to alter its difficulty. The objective is to increase revenues and extend the
useful life of the copy as a revenue-generating asset. Such licensee modifi-
cations may infringe the copyright interests of the first author.
The issue was discussed in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic Interna-
tional, Inc.117 The licensed user inserted a "speed-up" kit to modify a
successful game. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded that this constituted an infringing derivative work."" The Seventh
Circuit recognized that the Copyright Act does not clarify that a licensee is
barred from modifying a copy for its own use. The court, however, concluded
that the economics of the context required this result since, while the mod-
ification substantially increased revenues for the user, in the absence of such
modifications, the copyright holder would be able to control creation of
modified programs at a profit to it. This established a substantial commercial
effect that outweighed any general interest in providing the user an oppor-
tunity for enhancement work. The copyright holder is "entitled to monop-
olize" the preparation of derivative works by licensees where the modification
affects a potential commercial market." 9
The result should be different where the copy owner's modifications are
oriented to personal use unrelated to public display or distribution. While
section 117 limits even these modifications to "essential" adaptations, "es-
sential" must be interpreted in light of the interests involved. Latitude in
making enhancements should be permitted on a private basis so long as
these do not substantially affect the copyright owner. Private modifications
are analogous to underlining pages of a book, annotating or folding a copy
to enhance its usefulness. If the copyright proprietor has a right to control
116. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13.
117. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
118. Cf. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 741 (modifications sufficiently altered output to avoid
infringement, but modification kit itself violated object code copyright).
119. Artic, 704 F.2d at 1014.
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these modifications, it obtains a right to control use of the program, a right
that is not conveyed in the Copyright Act. 120
User modifications for personal, noncommercial use will most often con-
stitute a protected act, rather than an infringement. If the user owns the
copy of the program, the modifications are supported under section 117.
Even if the user does not "own" the copy, personal adaptations may be
implicitly authorized in the license (sale) agreement as an authorization to
the user to optimize use of the program. In addition, modifications for
personal use represent a clear application of fair use in respect to computer
software.' 2,
The fact that the modification is a protected act, however, does not shield
persons who distribute commercial products designed to enable such mod-
ifications. In practice, user modifications are often accomplished with com-
mercial kits manufactured by a third party. While the kits relate to user
rights, the commercial distribution materially alters the analysis. In many
cases, the kits directly affect markets into which entry by the original author
is a significant potential.
Third party products may directly infringe the copyright. In such cases,
although intended to assist an authorized user to extend the performance of
a program, no question of derivative works or authorized adaptations need
be considered. Reproduction and distribution of the product is an infringe-
ment. This was one conclusion in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon22
where the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
found an infringing substantial similarity in the machine code of the en-
hancement kit. Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc. 123
reached a similar result. In Hubco, Management Assistance (MAI) distributed
operating systems that had various levels of performance controlled relative
to the price for the license. The performance variations were artificially
created by features in distributed copies of the program. The defendant
(Hubco) developed a manual system to print the program code and identify
and remove the restraints. It also developed a computer program that per-
formed the same steps. The Idaho district court concluded that both manual
and computer forms of the enhancement process infringed the copyrighted
program. Each process produced a copy of the program as a step in iden-
tifying and removing restrictions. 24
A commercial product intended to modify a copyrighted work receives no
special protection. This is attributable to the significant commercial impact
that the modification kit may have on the original market for the program.
120. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2-18[A]; SAS, 568 F. Supp. 416 (license restriction
concerning use).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
122. 564 F. Supp. at 741.
123. 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983). See also Grogan, supra note 8.
124. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 456.
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In Hubco, the enhancement kit eliminated a market in which the author of
the original program was currently competing through the licensing of scaled
up programs. Decisions finding a direct infringement do not foreclose mod-
ification by the owner or licensee or, even, by third party procedures that
can be done without directly infringing the copyright.
The rights of distributors of modification kits also are affected by the
doctrine of contributory infringement. The essence of the doctrine is that
an individual who distributes a product used for illicit purposes by another
may have indirect liability if the actions of the buyer of the product constitute
an infringement. Contributory infringement law was recently redefined by
the United States Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.125 Sony is a landmark case dealing with the copyright
implications of the manufacture and distribution of video cassette recorder
(VCR) systems.
The Supreme Court established relatively stringent standards to establish
liability for the actions of third parties based on their use of a marketed
product. Lower court decisions had emphasized that liability existed if the
most conspicuous, intended use of the marketed product involved a copyright
infringement. The Supreme Court held that "the sale of copying equipment,
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses."'' 26 As to VCR equipment, the Court concluded that substantial non-
infringing uses existed, including the protected fair use copying for personal
use in the form of shifting the time when the program could be viewed at
home.
After Sony, contributory infringement cannot be based on the fact that
one application of the defendant's product facilitates copyright infringement
or that some or many users of the product use it that way. The balance
between the copyright proprietor and the third party manufacturer is struck
at a level that is more protective of the third party. Copyright infringement
claims extend to the third party only if there is no substantial, noninfringing
use for the product.' 27
CONCLUSION
Copyright law pertaining to computer software protection developed in
the context of a rapidly expanding industry and a perceived need to protect
against widespread piracy and unauthorized duplication of software products.
The character of computer programs and, especially, the ease with which
125. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
126. Id. at 442.
127. See Artic, 704 F.2d at 1009; Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 741.
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the technology can be reproduced, renders this industry particularly suscep-
tible to commercial piracy. Piracy permits the copiers to duplicate the product
in full and to undercut cost-price constraints applicable to the original
innovator. This reduces the existing commercial incentives for software de-
velopment and innovation.
These considerations justify a policy that differs from our approach to
other forms of technology. In other technologies, intellectual property doc-
trine holds that unpatented technology can be copied if this does not involve
breach of confidentiality. Patent protection is available for only a few
innovations. Most new products and technologies consequently enter the
marketplace without substantial protection against duplication. More pro-
tection is justified for software.
Under current law, protection against literal duplication of software is
available under copyright. This protection is available without a need to
document that the product is a significant innovation and applies whether
or not the program is in machine form or dedicated merely to the internal
operation of a computer.
The rationale that supports protection against commercial piracy does not
necessarily support extraordinary protection against other uses of the original
technology. The nature of the imitations and the character of the differences
in use must be clearly acknowledged. Use involves value-added adaptation
and development work. Third party's actions, therefore, may involve socially
desirable activity whose continuation should be accommodated along with
protection of the original author.
The ability of third parties to work with, add to and change existing
technology in the development of their own product is inherent in traditional
law regarding technology development in this country. Unlike software pir-
acy, there is no compelling rationale to treat software as immune to such
subsequent development work more than any other technology. Additive
development and shared or common use of basic technology tools is central
to innovation.
Within the field of copyright law, issues of balancing third party and
original author's rights are channeled through infringement standards. The
primary issue is an analysis of substantial similarity between the first work
and the second work. The author controls the right to make copies of its
work, but copyright does not extend to control over ideas or processes.
Conceptions of "idea" and "process" vary and are a direct product of
policy choices. In infringement issues, unlike with copyrightability, these
exclusions must be incorporated to preserve flexibility for secondary and
cumulative development.
Copyright standards for fiction and artistic works are applicable to many
computer programs. For other programs, however, they are overly expansive
and imbalanced. Computer code is technical and structured. The protection
issues are more analogous to those for factual or other technical works.,
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This Article has suggested that the interests of both the original developer
and of the second, value-added user are important and protectible. The
original author's protections are enhanced insofar as the alleged infringement
encompasses important aspects of the original work and directly impacts
markets into which the developer is likely to enter. The position of the
second party is heightened to the extent that its use is selective and devel-
opmental. The original author's claim weakens to the extent that it would
distort technology, development and control methods, operation and proc-
esses, rather than merely code idiosyncratic to the program. This balancing
does not create certainty in analysis of software infringement, but certainty
may be impossible to achieve. The balancing does provide for decision based
on relevant, not distorted or misdescribed factors. It provides a vehicle to
expressly recognize and protect third party rights.
